There is a large body of evidence that user fees in the health sector create exclusion. Health Equity Funds attempt to improve access to health care services for the poorest by paying the provider on their behalf. This paper reviews four hospital-based Health Equity Funds in Cambodia and draws lessons for future operations. It investigates the practical questions of "who should do what and how". It presents, in a comparative framework, similarities and differences in objectives, the actors involved, design aspects and functional modalities between the Health Equity Funds. The results of this review are presented along the lines of identification, hospitalization rates and relative costs.
INTRODUCTION
In many developing countries, user fees have been promoted as a strategy to generate resources for public health facilities. At a time of tight budget constraints, it was hoped that fee revenues would finance quality improvements, such as improved drug availability, staff motivation and running costs. Although it showed positive results when combined with effective quality improvement (Litvack and Bodart 1993) , it also increased the financial barrier on access to health care services; in many countries, it negatively impacted utilization (Creese 1991; Palmer et al. 2004) .
As an accompanying measure to the introduction of user fees, many governments decreed that poor patients should be accepted for free by the public health facility. Experience has shown that such exemption by decree was highly ineffective (Gilson 1997; Stierle et al. 1999; Willis and Leighton 1995) . As a matter of fact, it resulted in non-paying patients becoming a financial loss for the health facilities. Moreover, exemption of user fee payments may be an insufficient measure. Other participation costs, such as transportation costs and loss of daily income, may be major obstacles for poor households struggling for their living. Moreover, public sector salaries often do not allow the health staff a decent living. They then tend to complement their income through coping mechanisms, including informal fees (Ensor 2004; Ferrinho and Van Lerberghe 2000) . The poor are particularly vulnerable to such practices.
As a result of this limited access to public health providers, many poor households are pushed into sub-optimal health seeking behaviours such as foregoing treatment or using unregulated private facilities (Russell 1996) . These irrelevant health seeking behaviours may drive poor households into debt, jeopardizing their future well-being (Wilkes et al. 1998 ). This initiates a vicious circle in which poverty not only brings ill-health, but ill-health also tends to worsen poverty Wagstaff 2002; Whitehead et al. 2001) . The final outcome can be catastrophic, both in terms of health and wealth (Ranson 2002; Xu et al. 2003) .
This very unsatisfactory situation must be tackled. Two main routes have been proposed to governments willing to restore equity in their public health systems: (1) the removal of user fees and (2) the establishment of an accurate and effective waiver system for the poor combined with the upholding of user fees (James et al. 2007 ). This article relates to the second route.
The idea of targeting services to the poor is not specific to the health sector. Experiences in targeting abound all around the world in various sectors with different benefits, but the central issues remain the same: how to make sure that (1) the resources go to as many of the poor as possible (the concern for 'coverage') and not to the non-poor (the concern for no 'leakage') and (2) the assistance really fits the specific needs of the poor and leads to a significant outcome.
A large body of scientific literature attempts to assess how various targeted interventions have achieved these two goals, often with a bias towards the distributive question (Coady et al. 2004; Newbrander et al. 2000; van de Walle and Nead 1995) . Several experts have expressed a similar frustration: many studies document the performance of the programme in reaching the poor, but too few of them document the exact determinants of this performance. In their cross-sector review of programmes targeting the poorest, Coady et al. are very clear in their conclusion: "we need further work that deals with issues of implementation and cost effectiveness. Program managers need to be able to know more about the details of what was done elsewhere, why the choices were made, how they worked out, and what circumstances affected the outcomes" (Coady et al. 2004) . Even more recently, Hanson et al. express the same frustration with the targeting literature in the health sector: "most studies in the literature focus on measuring targeting outcomes (…) and few studies document the critical "how and why" issues (…)" (Hanson et al. 2006) . The objective of this paper is to contribute to this knowledge with respect to the recent experiences of health equity funds in Cambodia.
Health Equity Funds strategies have been developed in Cambodia in an attempt to improve access to health care services for the poorest by paying the provider on their behalf Crossland and Conway 2002; Hardeman et al. 2004; Jacobs and Price 2006; Van Damme et al. 2001) . The design of the strategy rests on two principles: (1) a specific fund is allocated to compensate selected health facilities for the services provided and (2) management of the fund is entrusted to a purchasing body that is independent of the health facility. This body-the HEF-operator-fulfils the functions of targeting. It is in charge of identifying eligible patients and tailoring the services to their needs. These services may include participation costs faced by patients that are not related to the health provider (such as transportation). The ambition is to remove, as much as possible, the multiple barriers faced by the poor.
In this journal, a case study by Hardeman et al. has proposed a way to articulate these functions in Sotnikum, Cambodia (Hardeman et al. 2004) . The decentralized organisation of the health system favoured the development of a variety of other models in the country. They illustrate the diversity of operational arrangements, both in terms of design and implementation. It now offers a good opportunity to draw lessons for policy development and harmonization. To what extent are these schemes different? Can one draw some common determinants of performance? What could be generalized or should not be generalized in terms of design? These questions are highly debated today in Cambodia in preparation for the national scaling-up of the strategy (Ministry of Health et al. 2006a) . We believe that they are also relevant in other countries, for policy makers, agencies and programme managers who consider developing similar strategies. In this paper, we approach these questions through a review of four ongoing health equity fund experiences in Cambodia. For that purpose, we propose an analytical framework that helps capture the "who should do what, and how?" questions.
The structure of the paper is the following. In the first section, we give the general context of the health sector in Cambodia. In the second section, the methods and study sites of our comparative study are presented. In the third section, we quickly make a case for an analytical framework. The fourth section provides our results. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the main findings, including their policy relevance.
CONTEXT
Cambodian society is still recovering from years of terror under the Khmer Rouge regime in the seventies and from civil war until the early nineties. From 1975 to 1979, the Khmer Rouge closed all health facilities and killed a large part of the medical staff. Attempts to rehabilitate the health system did not provide major improvement until stabilisation of the country in 1997.
In 1996, the Health Coverage Plan provided the first significant development in the health sector with a new mapping of health districts in the country. Each health district covers a population of 100,000 to 200,000 inhabitants. It consists of a network of health centres that deliver a basic package of health care services for 10,000 to 12,000 inhabitants. A complementary package of activities is entrusted to a District Referral Hospital. A district office co-ordinates and supervises all activities.
For many years, the Government has been supporting its health facilities, through the payment of salaries, the provision of drugs and medical equipment and partial financing of the running costs. Yet, this support remained a bit erratic and insufficient. In order to tackle this constraint, user fees were established in 1997 by the National Charter on Health Financing. According to the national guidelines, 49% can be devoted to salary supplements, 50% to running costs and 1% is retained for the Treasury. While the user fees offered a real opportunity to some public health facilities to consolidate their development, this has not been the case throughout the country (Barber et al. 2004) . In practice, this policy appeared to be insufficient to complement salaries which are often set below the poverty line. Civil servants develop coping mechanisms to reach a liveable income.
The Cambodian Government showed concerns about the barriers created by the introduction of user fees. Different mechanisms were established including a central control on the fee levels and a decree on fee exemption for the poor. As in other countries, the decree did not really translate into practice: very few patients were accepted for free and it was not clear whether those were the poorest. Alternatives had to be found. The Urban Health Project in Phnom Penh pioneered health assistance mechanisms for the poor in the late nineties. In 2000, Médecins Sans Frontières Belgium took up the idea for the health district hospitals it supported. Initially, the Health Equity Fund was set up as a complementary measure to a performance-based funding scheme called the New Deal (Meessen et al. 2002; Van Damme et al. 2001) . The HEF, however, rapidly became a strategy per se. The approach was presented in national workshops and captured the attention of operational actors, donors and the Cambodian government. Other agencies perceived the potential of the strategy to provide a bridge between the needs of resource mobilisation through user fees and access to service by the poor. With the political support of the Ministry of Health, they adapted the strategy for their projects to their own constraints and opportunities. In late 2006, there were 26 hospitalbased HEFs in operation in the country.
This interest in HEFs echoes the emerging awareness about the excessive share of out-ofpocket payment in health care financing in Cambodia. The total expenditure on health represents 10.9% of the GDP. The government only intervenes for 19.3% of health spending, the bulk of the remaining 80.7% being funded by users i . Out-of-pocket expenditures are primarily due to payments to unregulated private practitioners (Jacobs and Price 2004) and to unofficial payments in the public sector (Barber et al. 2004 ). In addition, various participation costs, such as transportation costs, also exist. In these conditions, payments for health care can rapidly turn into catastrophic health expenditures .
In Cambodia, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Social Affairs, as well as international donors perceive HEFs as a promising cross-sectorial strategy and co-funding source. The HEF is part of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005. The national HEF-framework will expand the experience to additional health districts (Ministry of Health 2005) . The results of this research and the comparative framework it provides may be useful tools in this process of harmonization and scaling-up.
STUDY SITES AND METHODS
Comparative studies may contribute to science in different ways (Landman 2003; Vigour 2005) . One can identify four main motives for undertaking a comparison. (1) Epistemological break: taking distance from one's isolated subject of study may facilitate the generation of new hypotheses. We clearly had such a purpose at the start of our study: all authors were influenced by one specific experience, and accumulating knowledge on other approaches was felt as a need to avoid restrictive views and misguided recommendations. (2) Descriptive pattern: researchers have to identify the key attributes for description. Some of them might not appear in isolated experiences. Our comparison facilitated the identification of the key characteristics of HEF schemes. It enriched the description of the individual cases and helped structuring the comparative framework. (3) Analytical step: having a comparative table may lead to classifications which make the cases less complex to understand. The single analytical framework that we used helped us identify commonalities and differences across the experiences reviewed. Although the development of a formal classification would require a larger sample, we already took some steps in this direction. (4) Theory building: comparison may eventually contribute to generalisation or theory building by validating or invalidating some hypotheses. As a matter of fact, this paper challenges some hypotheses underlying individual schemes (e.g. superiority of a pre-identification strategy) while it generalizes others (e.g. need for a driving actor at the initiation of the scheme) which may be used for design and policy recommendations.
Our comparative study rests on four case studies. Sites were selected through purposive sampling. The key criteria for selection were: (1) meeting the basic definition of HEFs (thirdparty payer for the poor); (2) being initiated and supported by different agencies; (3) providing an illustration of the variety of models; (4) being in operation long enough to give sufficient hindsight and routine data on the experience (at the date of 2004). In all reported experiences, HEFs were not designed in isolation, but as a complement to a wider strategy, including community participation, abolition of informal fees, a staff incentive scheme and quality improvement measures.
All reported HEFs were in operation during the period of review. However, the Sotnikum and Kirivong schemes have been slightly modified ii since their initiation. Today, they also propose services at health centre level. In both cases, this paper focuses on the initial experience, at hospital level only. The local health system context in which the four reported experiences operate is summarised in Table 1 . As far as method is concerned, the research started with a basic framework that summarised some broad questions we had on the observable diversity in terms of design and implementation. Since little was written about HEFs, we developed our comparison method iteratively. Between July 2003 and November 2004, the first author made six visits to Cambodia for a total of four months, working on various health financing and social protection issues. HEF models were a key strategy in all of the projects that he visited. All of the collected data and information were progressively processed into the framework. It also set light on neglected aspects that would be investigated during the following visits. During this period, the principal investigator maintained regular contact with the HEF key actors, including central health authorities and project co-ordinators.
Documenting an implementation process requires an intimate knowledge of the intervention itself (Coady et al. 2004) . Five of the co-authors (FG, IP, RT, BJ, WVD) have been strongly involved in the management of the HEF approaches described in this paper. They all played a key role in the initial design of the schemes, their development and the exchange of experiences.
Their field knowledge was tapped in the comparative study through interviews, informal discussions and, at a later stage, successive revisions of the paper. This information was completed with a review of the grey literature and peer-reviewed papers. Grey literature is mainly composed of international agencies' reports on initiation, development and evaluation of HEF approaches. It also comprises material developed for national and international workshops on the subject.
The principal investigator was careful to triangulate information on each case. During field visits, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a variety of other informants on various issues related to the health sector, social protection, HEF and perception of the users. Notes were taken, but the interviews were not taped. US$ are widely used in Cambodia, in addition to the national Riels, and the exchange rate remains very stable. We used an exchange rate of 4,000 Riels /US$.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND SOME DEFINITIONS
The HEF model differs from a health system that would rely exclusively on the public health care provider. The starting point of the strategy is to avoid conflicts of interest and clearly distinguish the functions that are to be fulfilled. This questioning on functions and actors has inspired other work in health systems reform (Kutzin 2000; Preker et al. 2000) .
We divided our questioning into three main themes: (1) The first part of the framework documents the possible actors for the roles of donor, HEF operator (on a daily basis), identifier, health care provider and monitoring and evaluation agent. Obviously, an actor may fulfil multiple functions, as the HEF operator who assists patients, negotiates with the provider and pays on behalf of the poor in all experiences.
The second part compares the strategies developed for these functions. There are various ways to identify the poor, purchase the services and contract with the provider. The performance of the scheme will also depend on the assistance and services provided. Health care provision will not be discussed in this comparison as it is always entrusted to the public provider in Cambodian experiences.
The data collected through routine procedures are meagre and poorly comparable. It constrained our analysis of the outcomes brought by the schemes. Opting for case studies gave us an insight into non-quantitative and context-specific aspects. But still, we had to limit ourselves to some basic indicators for identification, health services utilization and costs.
The main technical terms used in the following sections are defined in box 1.
Box 1: Main definitions
Household assessment: Identification process in which an identifier directly assesses, household by household, who is eligible for assistance.
Means testing: Assessment of the socio-economic status of a household, based on the household's income and / or wealth.
Proxy means testing: Assessment of the socio-economic status of a household, based on observable variables correlated with socio-economic status, such as ownership of assets, characteristics of the head of the household (e.g. gender, literacy, occupation) and family composition (e.g. demographic structure, number of disabled members).
Pre-identification: Assessment for eligibility of individual households, prior to the episode of illness. If the household assessment is done at home, proxies are directly observable by the identifier.
Passive identification: Identification performed at the point of use. It takes place on the hospital premises, when the patient asks for it or when they are referred for financial assistance for health care services. Unlike pre-identification, the proxies used for assessment are not directly observable by the identifier.
Equity certificate: Entitlement document delivered to the household prior to the episode of illness which is sufficient to guarantee subsidized access to the services during its period of validity. In the reported experiences, it comprises the necessary information to verify the household's composition, including a picture. Voucher: Entitlement document delivered to poor households upon request after the patient falls sick. It gives access to the same services as the equity certificate, but is only valid for one episode of illness. It only includes basic information about its holder, such as name and place of living.
RESULTS
In this section, we subsequently describe similarities and differences in the approaches under review through the prism of our comparative framework.
WHO DOES WHAT?
Representatives of foreign agencies played a major role in the four experiences regarding programme formulation, definition of eligibility criteria, supervision and development of the schemes. Other functions, such as identification, daily management and routine monitoring, were entrusted to various actors, such as health authorities, community representatives, religious leaders and civil society as summarized in table 2. 
ACTORS & ROLES
In Sotnikum and Svay Rieng, the supporting agency designed the main aspects of the HEF in isolation. The strategy was then proposed and discussed with local stakeholders. It was formally approved by the members of the steering committee of the New Deal in Sotnikum. UNICEF did not integrate such a step in Svay Rieng, although a consensus was sought for later adaptations.
In comparison, Enfants & Développement representatives developed the Kirivong HEF concept in consultation with the District Chief Monks, Governors and the Health District Directorate. HealthNet International also adopted a participatory approach in Pearang which went down to the village level, with a process of informal negotiations on proposals of designs. The consulted actors were from the health sector, local and administrative authorities, population and civil society, from the district level to villages.
The supporting agency provides and channels the funding in all experiences, except in Kirivong where pagodas and mosques collect voluntary donations from the population. The pagodas are the places of worship for Buddhists who represent 90% of the population in Cambodia. More than just premises, they are real organizations playing an important role in social life, especially in rural areas.
Pagodas are also in charge of the daily management in Kirivong. They follow up the services delivered to the beneficiaries and they pay the health care providers. In Svay Rieng, this task was first left to UNICEF during the first stages of the scheme. In 2004, it was handed over to a new Provincial Equity Fund Support Committee, composed of local pagoda representatives, administrative authorities and local NGOs. The remaining option among reported experiences is to contract a national NGO to ensure daily management. In Pearang, the NGO was specifically created for that purpose.
We can distinguish three strategies regarding identification: pre-identification alone in Kirivong, passive identification alone in Sotnikum and a combination of both in Pearang and Svay Rieng.
In all experiences with pre-identification, community members participate to a certain degree; yet, they are never the sole actors. In Svay Rieng, the district health staff conducted the preidentification in collaboration with Village Health Support Group members and local authorities. UNICEF staff monitored the process. In Kirivong, the pre-identification was carried out by members of the Health Centre Management Committees in tandem with the village chiefs and it was endorsed by the respective pagoda chief monks. In Pearang, local trained volunteers were in charge of the initial pre-identification, with assistance from the village leaders and community representatives, under the supervision of the national NGO.
Passive identification requests the presence of an actor at hospital level. In Pearang and Sotnikum, the national NGO detects poor patients arriving at the hospital and conducts interviews to assess their socio-economic status. In Svay Rieng, hospital staff occasionally performed passive identification until the pre-identification process was completed, but new inclusions rapidly became rare.
Daily monitoring is entrusted to the HEF operator in Svay Rieng and Pearang. It mainly consists of securing the provision of health services to assisted patients and verifying the poverty status of pre-identified households. In Sotnikum, a team consisting of the key decision-makers was built up for that purpose. In Kirivong, this function was replaced by the implementation of six-monthly surveys on the performance of the scheme and the identification process by Enfants & Développement.
HOW TO IDENTIFY?
In all cases, the poorest households are identified through household assessments. Similarly, all experiences formalized the selection process with identification criteria. But, as summarized in Table 3 , there are differences in terms of the place and time of selection, as well as in the criteria, methods and tools that were used. Pre-identification relies on a community-based targeting approach in Kirivong, and on a formal questionnaire, conducted by trained actors, in Pearang and Svay Rieng. In the first case, local knowledge of households' socio-economic status was considered to be at least as accurate as, and certainly less expensive than proxy means testing. In the second case, the rationale was that poverty status had to be scored in order to ensure both horizontal and vertical equity.
Not surprisingly, the first option provided a faster identification process. In Kirivong, an indicative set of poverty criteria was communicated to local monks and community representatives of each health centre's target population. In a few hours (or days), they listed those that they deemed eligible within their community. A few weeks were needed to reach a consensus about the identified households' eligibility and to get the endorsement from the pagodas' chief monks. The final list was distributed to health care providers and local administrative authorities. In Pearang and Svay Rieng, a standard questionnaire was filled in for each new investigated household. Each question of the household assessment relates to one of the retained criteria. A score is set for each question. The total of all scores is then compared with a threshold that is considered to represent the border between poor and poorest of the poor. The completion of the pre-identification process took about 9 months in Pearang (200,000 inhabitants) and two years in Svay Rieng (530,000 inhabitants). The main steps were an initial household assessment, screening of the selected households to verify the assessment and a search for eligible households who had been excluded, taking a photo of the household and distribution of vouchers to ensure access before the distribution of definitive equity certificates. Identification questionnaires were compiled into a database that then computed the total score of the household and compared it with the set threshold. A list of eligible households was edited and distributed to health care providers.
Passive identification is either used in isolation (Sotnikum) or in combination with preidentification techniques. In Pearang and Svay Rieng, passive identification is based on the same questionnaire that is used for pre-identification. The only difference is in terms of assistance: passively identified patients do not receive an entitlement document. In Sotnikum, passive identification is based on indicative criteria. A check-list exists, but these criteria are neither communicated outside the NGO, nor formalized in a systematic questionnaire, reportedly to avoid gaming of the interview by the applicants. The NGO staff sometimes make home visits for a selection of beneficiaries to verify their poverty status. No certificate or voucher is issued. Monthly records give an overview of the total services provided per patient and their cost, but it does not link these data with the profile of selected households.
In Sotnikum, Pearang and Svay Rieng, regular home visits are conducted to verify the socioeconomic status of a sample of beneficiaries according to a list of criteria. These visits are also an opportunity to assess the satisfaction of the users with the health care services and social assistance. In Kirivong, six-monthly surveys fill a similar function. In addition, the population's willingness to financially contribute to the scheme gives an indication of its social acceptance, including reliability of the pre-identification process.
HOW TO ASSIST?
The experiences under review provide different documents for formalizing the entitlement of applicants (equity certificate, voucher or nothing). The process of requesting assistance then differs as does the benefit package. In Svay Rieng and Pearang, pre-identified households only have to show their equity certificate to the HEF-operator to benefit from HEF assistance in case of illness. It is valid for all listed household members. The equity certificate includes a photo of the household as a means to ascertain the identity of beneficiaries.
In Kirivong, pre-identified households did not receive a certificate, but they were informed about their eligibility and benefits by community representatives. When sick, HEF-beneficiaries visit the health care provider with their identity card or election card. They get certification from the health care provider upon receipt of the health care services delivery. They hand it over to their local representatives for administration purposes. Non-selected households may also ask their respective pagoda chief monk for inclusion after the pre-identification process is completed.
In all experiences, passive identification does not give a right to any entitlement document. Applicants have no guarantee that they will be admitted under the scheme or not. In the course of an episode of illness, they may directly ask for an interview with the HEF-operator based in the hospital compound, or be detected and referred by hospital staff. A screening procedure is then conducted to assess their eligibility. In all cases, passively identified patients are only entitled to the benefit package for the current episode of illness. It induces a difference with pre-identified patients who know that they may benefit from HEF assistance any time illness strikes.
Pearang, Kirivong and Sotnikum systematically offer full exemption of the user fees at hospital level, but partial exemptions are an exception. In Svay Rieng, the percentage of exemption of user fees depends on the poverty score of the patient's household.
In most schemes, a variety of extra services are provided, including transport to the hospital. Initial needs assessment and regular ward visits by the HEF-operator are essential to identify other services needed by the patient. It may require other expertises as in Pearang where extra services include referrals to upper levels outside the health district (mainly in Phnom Penh). These additional benefits are more restricted in Sotnikum and Svay Rieng. Kirivong does not provide additional benefits (no presence of the HEF-operator at hospital level), but it is noticeably the only experience to offer (fully exempted) health care services at health centre level as well.
HOW TO MAKE THE PROVIDER ACCOUNTABLE?
The willingness of the provider to contribute to the system also matters. Different mechanisms and payment methods have been used to enforce his accountability. In the two approaches using a national NGO as the HEF-operator (Sotnikum and Pearang), a contract formalizes the relationships between the donor (foreign agency) and the HEFoperator. A second level of contracting between the HEF-operator and the district hospital was added. These contracts are intended to ensure accountability of the HEF-operator of the fund and the health care provider, and to set quality standards to be reached. The relationship with the HEF-operator was not formalized in Svay Rieng or Kirivong.
All of the schemes compensate providers on a fee-for-service basis. Calculation methods are simple and transparent; fees are those used for paying patients, and disbursements are made on a regular basis. In Pearang and Kirivong, the health care provider assumes part of the exemption, while they are fully subsidized in Svay Rieng and Sotnikum.
WHAT ARE THE OUTCOMES IN TERMS OF UTILIZATION?
Table 6 reveals important differences in the proportion of the population deemed eligible. Svay Rieng presents twice the proportion of pre-identified persons as Pearang. 71% of the Svay Rieng pre-identified members may benefit from 100% exemption, 15% from a 75% exemption and 14% from 50% exemption. As mentioned above, the initial Sotnikum scheme did not include pre-identification. . This is particularly striking in Pearang. This, however, does not take into account the proportion of the population that may be selected through passive identification. Table 7 shows major differences in terms of utilization of the services iii by the HEFbeneficiaries. 
UTILISATION
For the reported period, the Kirivong model presents the highest general hospitalization rate. Nevertheless, it presents the lowest rate for the group of individuals entitled to HEF assistance. It is the only experience in which, on aggregate, HEF-entitled individuals use hospital services less than non-entitled individuals. In Pearang, the average hospital admission rate is 8 times higher for HEF-entitled individuals than for paying patients. This difference is less striking in Svay Rieng. HEF-beneficiaries represent between 30 and 50% of hospitalized patients in Pearang, Svay Rieng and Sotnikum, and less than 10% in the Kirivong hospital.
Hardeman et al. have found that implementation of the HEF in Sotnikum led to a sustained increase in access to health care services for HEF beneficiaries (Hardeman et al. 2004) . The same applies to at least two of the three other experiences as illustrated below in Figure 1 . In these three experiences, HEF-beneficiaries come on top of the average number of hospitalized patients who paid their own fees in previous periods. On aggregate, there seems to be no transfer from paying patients to HEF-beneficiaries. This suggests that HEF-patients represent new patients, who were unable to pay for health care services.
In Pearang, we observe a high peak in the third trimester of 2003, partly due to a high demand of untreated surgical care from the newly entitled HEF-members. In 2004, HEF-patients represent more than half of the patients of Pearang hospital. During the same time, the proportion of paying patients is slightly less than the average in previous periods. In Kirivong, HEF-beneficiaries only represent 7% of the total hospitalizations. This does not allow for a conclusion of clear causality between the impact of the HEF and hospitalization data. Table 8 shows the costs of the four HEFs, comparing the expenditures for direct assistance and for running costs. Pre-identification costs are considered to be an investment and are analysed separately in Table 9 . 
WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES IN TERMS OF COSTS?

EXPENDITURES
The expenditures on medical assistance iv per beneficiary at hospital level are similar for Sotnikum, Svay Rieng and Pearang. In Pearang, expenditures on extra services equate to more than this amount, mainly for referrals outside the district and transportation. Medical expenditures per beneficiary in Kirivong equate to half the amount of the other HEFs. In fact, the largest portion of Kirivong that was allocated to direct assistance was consumed by services at health centre level, which are not integrated in this study.
In combination with other funding sources (including Government subsidies), the amount invested in user fees is far inferior to the real costs of hospital care services obtained for the poor. In Sotnikum, it has been demonstrated that the payment of US$7-10 on user fees enabled access for the poorest to average US$53-worth of health care services (Hardeman et al. 2004) . This is mainly because the Government guarantees a quite reliable supply of drugs, even when utilization increases due to HEF-beneficiaries.
Running costs strongly differ v . The two NGO-managed experiences, Sotnikum and Pearang, present the highest costs. In both cases, staff salaries account for about 40% of the costs. The remaining difference is caused by frequent travelling by the Pearang HEF-staff (mainly for monitoring). In Sotnikum and Kirivong, the reported running costs are slightly overestimated since they include expenditures related to the services delivered at the health centre level.
The calculated costs per beneficiary and per year must be interpreted cautiously. They surely give an indication, but are not sufficient to compare the economic performance of all schemes. They must be analysed in consideration of the benefits proposed to poor households and in consideration of the qualitative dimensions of the scheme which may not be represented in the figures.
The yearly cost per enrolled member is interesting. It gives the cost of insuring a single person, under the specific conditions of benefit package, hospitalization rate and administrative workload. With these assumptions, protecting the poor would cost between US$ 0.1 and 2.4 per "insurance member". Ideally, expenditures for passively identified beneficiaries should be withdrawn. Also pre-identification costs should be brought back to a yearly cost, and integrated into the calculation. Table 9 presents the total investment consented for preidentification in the reviewed experiences. 
PRE-IDENTIFICATION COSTS
Pre-identification costs were the most difficult to assess vi . These costs are not expressed on a yearly basis as the actual validity period of the pre-identification is unknown. As compared with Svay Rieng, the Pearang expenditures probably provide the most realistic picture of the cost incurred by a rapid pre-identification strategy, with continuous support of an external agency, photo taking and printing of equity certificates.
When pre-identification is expressed per capita, we can observe that a simple communitybased approach (Kirivong) provides a cheaper solution than a "volunteers" approach supported by an NGO, with delivery of a strong entitlement (Pearang). The quality of the targeting method should be assessed before drawing further conclusions. Pre-identification costs should also be appreciated with respect to the validity period of the entitlement. Most experiences were planned for two years but, except in Kirivong, this period has been extended without renewal of the pre-identification.
DISCUSSION
MAIN FINDINGS
This paper confirms that a HEF can enhance access to hospital services by the poorest people. This study is not a benefit-incidence assessment (Gwatkin et al. 2005 ). Yet, there are good reasons to believe that HEF beneficiaries are among the poorest group: (1) In Kirivong, Pearang and Svay Rieng, the pre-identification was a transparent and monitored process, including field cross-checks and involvement of actors with limited stakes. (2) In Sotnikum, the international NGO organised its monitoring ex post (via hospital bed census). While cases of under-coverage were reported, cases of leakage were not. Moreover, in at least three of the four sites, the increase of HEF-beneficiaries has coincided with a constant utilization by paying patients. This gives the indication that HEF-beneficiaries are, as an aggregate, real new users of the hospital.
In the reported sites, the utilization increase by the HEF beneficiaries tends to confirm that the HEF-model is superior to the exemption system that was previously in place. The comparison of HEFs with other Cambodian experiences that exclusively rely on hospital resources during the same period also favour the HEF-model. In such cases-where the provider identifies the patient for exemption and bears the cost of the health care services consumed-exemption rates remained at a maximum level of 3% (Akashi et al. 2004; Barber et al. 2004) , far below the lowest results reached by the reported HEFs.
The success of social assistance mechanisms also depends on the advantages conveyed for other stakeholders (Wagstaff et al. 2004 ). The HEF model pays attention to the constraints faced both by the providers (necessity to recover the costs) and by the poor (inability to cover the different participation costs). It then tackles a major flaw in the design of traditional waiver schemes (Gilson 1997) . In Cambodia, the influx of HEF-patients means a supplementary income for health facilities. It improves their financial stability and it increases staff salary bonuses and the money available for running costs. This offers justification for quality demands and contracting of the provider.
The comparative study reveals that there are different ways to implement the HEF model. Pros and cons of the various options are discussed below. Although they would benefit being tested on a larger scale, we believe that these results can already provide useful landmarks for readers interested in design, operation and evaluation of similar strategies. They are summarized in table 10 at the end of the Main findings section.
Who does what?
As far as distribution of roles is concerned, one can observe commonalties and differences across the four experiences.
A central common feature is the need to identify a driving force since the start of the scheme. In the reviewed experiences, international agencies have filled this role. Their financial capacity is only part of the explanation. Good knowledge of the field and local actors (thanks to decentralised projects), public health expertise, and operational flexibility have been key assets. Their commitment to results, pragmatism and the fact that they could, politically speaking, take risks, have allowed them to fully play a catalytic role.
Who will fund the approach is another determining question. Experience shows that external funding is essential for (expensive) hospital services. It may be seen as a weakness in terms of sustainability, but external funding also permitted to test the model freely, with only minor budget restrictions. Evidence gathered concerning the efficiency of the approach is now used to orientate the Cambodian Government and international donors in the preparation of the national HEF-framework. The Kirivong approach of locally raising resources is an alternative, but its limits are clear: coverage and the benefit package are constrained by the community's contribution capacity. 'Matching grants' (e.g., for every US$ 1 collected at the local level, the central government or donors commit another US$ 1) could be a way to combine the two approaches.
The active role taken by international agencies should not create the illusion that the government was indifferent to the experiments. In fact, at this level, one can identify an important role of the Cambodian health authorities. Since the very start, they have been very supportive of the strategy. It is also thanks to their openness that a variety of approaches have been tested.
Our review also shows that a clear separation of functions is a requirement in the four HEFs: neither purchasing, nor identification should be entrusted to health care providers in order to avoid conflicts of interest. An external HEF-operator is then assigned for daily operation of the HEF. The four experiences have adopted different tracks which all appear effective. The Svay Rieng and Kirivong experiences seem to invalidate the previous belief that contracting a local NGO was the best option (Hardeman et al. 2004) . But the operating bodies that they have adopted respect the same key principles: (1) good knowledge of the socio-economic conditions of the population; (2) minimal managerial capacity; (3) no conflict of interest towards patients or providers, so that they are not to be subject to pressure; (4) accountable to the sponsor; and (5) guarantee a presence at hospital level. All options have advantages and drawbacks. For example, the involvement of national NGOs is aimed at tapping national expertise (Sotnikum) or building it (Pearang) in a sustainable way; yet, this incurred high recurrent running costs, a high turnover of staff and stronger dependence on external funding. Pagoda management in Kirivong may appear to be a good low-cost alternative, but it did not allow for passive identification and contributed to low hospitalization due to a poor presence on the premises.
The task of pre-identification seems to require the participation of community members. They were involved at different levels in the three concerned sites. Their insider knowledge avoids the need to screen the entire population. Yet, in the three sites, their expertise has been combined with that of some other actors. This strategy seems particularly relevant to enforce common eligibility criteria across communities and to protect the scheme from capture by the local elite (Conning and Kevane 2001).
In all cases, the provision of health care services was exclusively entrusted to the public sector. Private providers should not be rejected on principle. However, in Cambodia, the absence of binding regulations with respect to the services, quality and costs make them unreliable partners. Also may the costs be considerably higher compared to the public services which are highly subsidized in Cambodia.
How to identify?
Reported experiences show similarities in terms of targeting techniques and identification criteria, but they differ in terms of the tools and identification processes that were used.
HEF experiences clearly confirm that there is not a "one fits all" targeting technique. Using a combination of targeting techniques according to the context reduces the risk of leakage to non-poor and exclusion of the real poor (Devereux 2002; Gwatkin 2000; Willis and Leighton 1995) . In the reported experiences, individual household assessments are central since they are the most appropriate qualifier to target services based on one's poverty status (Newbrander et al. 2001) . Other techniques are complementary, such as self-targeting (HEF assistance is accessed by the utilisation of the contracted hospital), geographic targeting (implementation in specific geographic settings) and community-based targeting (through a certain degree of participation by the community).
They also tend to show that proxy means testing are the most appropriate means for assessing the socio-economic status of households in the context of rural Cambodia. In these poor settings, this is far more relevant than means testing, which is solely based on income (Bitran and Giedon 2003) . Different sets of criteria and weights can be selected, but they should all correlate with poverty; be easily observable; verifiable by a third-party; and be immune to manipulation by applicants (Devereux 2002) .
There is no clear answer regarding the tools that should be used for identification. In Pearang and Svay Rieng, criteria were formalized in a household assessment questionnaire. The questionnaire facilitates verification and gives the opportunity to draw the socio-economic profile of enrolled members in a database. In Sotnikum and Kirivong, criteria are communicated to the identifier but are not formalized in a questionnaire for the sake of sensitivity to specific socio-economic conditions. There were concerns that it would open a path to social pressure and increase leakage. This is not reflected in our results.
This study does not allow for a comparison of the performance of the four schemes in terms of leakage and coverage errors. As already mentioned, in the four schemes, monitoring and cross-checking never evidenced that leakage was a problem. Under-coverage probably remains an issue, as shown by the comparison with estimates of the population below the poverty line in the four sites (Table 6 ).
There has been quite some debate in Cambodia concerning whether pre-identification should be a 'must' for any HEF scheme. Proponents of this option underline the fact that passive identification as a stand-alone leaves the potential beneficiaries uncertain about their eligibility. This may be a major barrier for potential beneficiaries. Opponents of this option stress the important costs that pre-identification may entail. Our study does not settle this debate, but it provides some interesting insights. (1) Passive identification alone can be quite effective in terms of coverage as experienced in Sotnikum; but to be optimal, it may require good information campaigns in the communities, including some time for the word of mouth. (2) Passive identification appears to be an easy way to initiate the scheme and gain early visibility. This may be useful to convince stakeholders to support the strategy. (3) Pre-identification may indeed require considerable time and energy, as demonstrated in Svay Rieng. But the identification costs seem to depend much more on the identifying agent than on the identification technique. This finding has also been observed elsewhere (Hanson et al 2006) . If one could dare, the ideal set-up for the poor may be a pre-identification in synergy with other social assistance programmes, combined with passive identification at the point of use.
How to assist?
Securing access to health care services requires addressing various barriers faced by the patient on both the demand and supply-side (Ensor and Cooper 2004) . This section looks into the financial and non-financial demand-side barriers. HEF experiences attempt to address them through a combination of (1) a benefit package tailored to the needs of the poor and (2) mechanisms to make targeted households feel secure about their entitlement.
HEF offers free hospital care at the four sites. This fits with the diagnosis that the poor in Cambodia mainly face accessibility barriers at hospital level. Giving timely access to effective hospital services may bring both a significant health benefit and some social protection.
A second common lesson is that the benefit package must not be limited to user fees. In Cambodia, non-health related costs accounted for an important share of the households' expenditure in health (Hardeman et al. 2004; Jacobs and Price 2004 ). Distance appears consensually as the first additional barrier to be addressed (Yanagisawa et al. 2004 ). In addition, other services may be needed. The presence of a hospital-based social worker appears to be a prerequisite to tailor the services to the specific needs of the patients. It can be considered a benefit, especially in combination with some social and psychological support.
Only the Kirivong scheme includes first line health services in the benefit package. Should it be generalized? There is no clear answer. The financial burden is undoubtedly much lower at health centre than at hospital level. But, benefits at health centre are likely to redirect health seeking behaviours of poor households (Jacobs & Price 2006) by reducing reliance on selftreatment and crooks. As the services they deliver are quite ineffective and expensive, early utilisation of the public health system can be beneficial in terms of health and wealth.
Regarding entitlement, some authors suggest that granting a formal document to patients is a good way to strengthen their knowledge and confidence about the system and its modalities (Bitran and Giedon 2003) . It may influence the patient's health seeking behaviour and generate both a health and welfare benefit. In this respect, a HEF, with pre-identification and distribution of an equity certificate, acts as a health insurance with payment of the premium by a third-party. In Cambodia, however, the impact of this insurance on behaviour of selected households remains unclear. Sotnikum did not deliver certificates to its beneficiaries, but its results are similar to those of Pearang and Svay Rieng. Other determinants such as communication and the perceived quality of services also exist.
How to make the provider accountable?
As a complement to other strategies, a HEF is a means to influence supply-side barriers by stimulating the health care provider to respect certain standards. It will depend on (1) the payment method and (2) the mechanisms fostering accountability of the health care provider.
Fair and timely compensation of the provider is a major determinant of its accountability. By proceeding to monthly payments on a fee-for-services basis, all experiences act virtually the same as a patient paying for its services. It gives the provider a strong incentive to positively consider access of the poorest, as each additional patient equates to additional income. It is then important that the level and conditions of payment are negotiated and agreed upon with the provider. In Kirivong and Pearang, this opened the path to partial (consensual) payments.
Different accountability mechanisms can be considered. In Pearang and Sotnikum, a contract with the provider is an attempt to formalize the pursuit of quality standards in exchange for full payment. It underlines accountability to the donor, while the two other experiences place accountability with the population. There is no evidence that formal accountability gives better results. Some health facilities signed contracts with the community and pagoda representatives in Kirivong. In Svay Rieng and the remaining facilities of Kirivong, emphasis was put only on social control, through regular meetings with community representatives. 
Who does what?
Targeting techniques can be used in combination
Complementarity and cross-validation reduce the risk of leakage and exclusion.
Prefer proxy-means testing to means testing A method based on income or expenditures is more expensive and less reliable in poor rural areas.
No single answer regarding the identification tool
We found no evidence that a formal household assessment questionnaire was superior to other tools.
There is no firm evidence in favour of pre-identification
It also has time and budget implications. The minimal option may be passive identification by a social worker at hospital level. Both can also be used in combination.
How to identify?
Subsidizing hospital care is an absolute need
The cost of accessing hospital services represents a major financial barrier. The answer is not as clear cut when it comes to first line health services.
Non-health related costs should be considered User fees are not the only barrier. Distance and related costs can also act as major deterrents. The presence of a social worker can secure the provision of services.
Make targeted households feel secure about their entitlement Granting an equity certificate can be an option. However, knowledge and confidence also depend on communication and perceived quality of care.
How to assist?
Agree on a fair and timely reimbursment mechanism
In order to ensure the provider is willing to welcome supported poor patients.
Formal contracting is not the only way to make the provider accountable There is no evidence it gave better results than simpler social control mechanisms.
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE STUDY
This paper proposes the first comparative gridline of HEF-experiences in Cambodia. As already mentioned, our analytical framework was developed in an iterative way. It may henceforth be considered as one of the final outcomes of the study. While mainly descriptive, we believe that the framework can be a useful tool for different actors. It has been tested on different fields and discussed through presentations and reviews by peers. In Cambodia, its independent utilisation by a consultant (requested by the Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization office) to compare all the HEFs in the country has been a useful source of validation. The first HEF national forum held in Phnom Penh in February 2006 confirmed that the framework was helpful to structure the debate on some key issues (Ministry of Health et al. 2006a ). All decentralized experiences were tainted by their context. Making a conceptual step backward was needed before moving toward harmonization. The framework can also be useful to actors willing to design and implement similar strategies in other contexts. It shows that there are alternative options and, as long as key principles are respected, adaptation to local contexts should be favoured. Eventually, the framework may help scientists describe the schemes that they evaluate.
The main weakness of this study is the limited results it provides in terms of scheme performance measurement. This is firstly due to our exclusive utilisation of the routine data generated either by the HEF or the hospital. It restricted the number of comparative indicators we used in the framework. A second constraint has been the non-standardisation of reports and monitoring tools across HEF schemes. There is clearly a need to adopt a common format for the whole country. This will provide basic indicators that will allow some simple, but quite useful comparison between schemes.
PRO-POOR POLICIES
This paper compares different arrangements of HEFs. It explores a range of choices within a specific approach. There are alternative policies including the abolition of user fees. In a recent review, the experience of abolishing user fees in Uganda and the HEF approach have been compared (Meessen et al. 2007) . It has shown that each strategy has advantages and disadvantages.
Much less has been reported on the possible connections between HEFs and communitybased health insurance. Community-based health insurance is often presented as a strategy for contributing to poverty reduction and moving towards a system of universal social protection. However, literature shows that very few schemes reached the poorest (Carrin et al. 2005) . This requires specific targeted subsidies for the poor, in accordance with a broader health financing context (Bennett 2004; Schneider 2004) . It also needs to address other barriers that may particularly affect the most vulnerable, including questions related to benefit package and accountability of the provider. In its current set up, HEF strategies meet these conditions. In Cambodia, it is seen as the source of funding of the poorest households premiums under a future national project of social health insurance. Poor households would be entitled to the same services as contributing households (Ministry of Health et al. 2006b ).
This paper provides an estimation of the insurance cost. Under current conditions, the cost of insuring one poor individual for one year would be US$0.10 in Kirivong, US$0.32 in Svay Rieng and US$2.56 in Pearang (with linear depreciation of the pre-identification costs over three years). It gives a range from a community-based approach, with related limitations, to a more extended model, supported by external actors. It is likely that individual costs would decrease with an extension of the coverage. The production of an equity certificate, including a picture of the household in Pearang and Svay Rieng was particularly time consuming and impacted the total cost of the insurance.
The Cambodian experience shows that synergies are also possible with vertical programmes. In Cambodia, as in many low-income countries, AIDS or TB curative programmes are free to the users. Yet, other barriers such as transport and stigma remain. This may be an important cause for low enrolment and further impoverishment of vulnerable households. Some HEF operators have henceforth decided to open their assistance to these groups. This may require opting for characteristic targeting, based on a specific characteristic such as a given disease, instead of the poverty profile.
It would be relevant to further explore the possible synergies between HEF and other social assistance programmes, such as cash transfers or school allowance. Targeting the poor is not specific to the health sector. Sharing the household assessment with other sectors could be a source of efficiency and provide a more holistic response to the needs of the poorest. The databases developed in the pre-identification processes may represent a useful ground for that.
Finally, the relevance of the approach for other countries must be tested. Some experiences have recently been launched in Sub-Saharan Africa (Noirhomme and Thomé 2006) . The first analyses highlight necessary differences in the design (importance of food security in the identification criteria, different impacts of distance and road conditions on access, etc.). More importantly, it seems that the principle of identifying the poorest in the community and of granting them (what could be perceived as) privileges could get less social and political support than in the Cambodian culture.
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND WAYS FORWARD
Experience with HEFs is still short and limited in terms of settings. Some operational issues have received too little attention. For example, the fact that poverty is a dynamic phenomenon is often not well reflected in the identification techniques of the schemes. Lists of entitled households must be updated after a certain time. Similarly, there should be simple means for previously rejected households to apply for a new assessment of their situation.
These kinds of operational arrangements will come from practice. In that respect, the current variety of approaches in the country is an asset. It will help the government and other stakeholders to appreciate what the best strategy is, given the local needs and constraints. To that purpose, comparison is certainly insightful, but it needs preparation. This study has revealed that some standardization in the routine data systems and definitions would be helpful.
There are also issues at the policy level. A clearer statement of pursued objectives would be useful. This would allow sharpening of indicators to assess performance, and would set clear directions for implementers. Aside from improving access to hospital care, other objectives deserve consideration. Putting protection against catastrophic health care expenditure high on the agenda may dictate specific operational orientations (e.g., progressive integration of HEFs into community-based health insurance, extension of the benefit package to third line services). Conversely, if the HEF is conceived, first of all, as a social assistance strategy towards the poorest, scheme operators will have to be more pro-active and holistic in their approach. In practice, we have observed that HEF-staff often operate more as administrative clerks than as real social workers. Core poverty is difficult to tackle and granting free health care will not be enough. Capabilities such as security, self-esteem and dignity have to be addressed (Sen 1995 , Alkire 2002 .
The limits of this study also indicate possible tracks for further research. A real benefitincidence analysis would be useful. Assessment of the impacts of the scheme on households requires specific primary data collection. Household surveys and dynamic studies of poverty, such as panel data analysis, would be very valuable. It could confirm the social protection function of the HEFs.
A last challenge for the scientists active in Cambodia will be to keep pace with the general development of pro-poor policies in the country. Before being a "field of study", poverty is an unacceptable reality. Fighting it requires bold actions, including actions in the political arena. In Cambodia, as elsewhere in the world, we need to better understand how pro-poor policies emerge and we need to gain support from national actors. This understanding will be the real key to change.
http://www3.who.int/whosis/core/core_select_process.cfm?country=khm&indicators=nha&language=en ii Later, Médecins Sans Frontières launched decentralized HEFs on a pilot basis in some health centres. The Sotnikum project has been taken over by the Belgian Technical Cooperation in mid-2004 and is experiencing new adaptations. In the same period, the Swiss Red Cross replaced Enfants & Développement in the management of the Kirivong Operational District, and made modifications of the HEF at the Referral Hospital, whereby pagodas collect money for health services only, and a local NGO operates the HEF for the hospital with external funding.
iii Remarks on the calculation method of hospitalization rates. The hospitalization rate was calculated by using the number of pre-identified individuals as the denominator and total number of beneficiaries (both pre-identified and passively identified) as the numerator. It induces an over-estimation. In Pearang, activity reports on HEF-beneficiaries do not allow a distinction between enrolled members (who have received an equity certificate) and non-enrolled beneficiaries (passively identified when they seek care). In Svay Rieng, this information is only available for aggregated figures of hospitalizations and ambulatory consultations, while this paper only focuses on hospitalizations. In Sotnikum, the figures presented above also include a small portion of beneficiaries from pilot zones in which equity certificates and health vouchers were distributed to pre-identified poor households.
iv Remarks on the calculation method of medical expenditures. The HEF's medical expenditure in Sotnikum could not be disaggregated. They comprise some partially exempted patients and minor expenditures on other benefits. Total beneficiaries of the Svay Rieng experience include patients benefiting from a 75 and 50% exemption only (30 and 11% of the beneficiaries, respectively). For the reported period, 100% of exemptions amounted to a total of $25,073, i.e. $25.9 per beneficiary, which was significantly higher than the $21.9 presented in Table 7. v Remarks on the calculation method of running costs. Svay Rieng running costs are estimated as a portion of the salaries of two UNICEF staff members affected in Svay Rieng. In Kirivong, as pagodas coordinate almost all the daily management of the fund, running costs only comprise the per diems paid to the interviewers during the biannual surveys. These surveys were paid by Enfants & Développement and did not consume the donations collected by the pagodas.
vi Remarks on the calculation method of pre-identification costs. According to the collected data, Pearang invested the highest amount in pre-identification, at the beginning of the scheme. Almost half of it was spent on per diems for "volunteers" who proceeded to the pre-identification visits. The remaining was allocated to salaries of national NGO-staff during the pre-identification period, to training and to the development of material. In Svay Rieng, per diems for the control team represent half of the preidentification costs. An additional 23% was spent on administrative staff. UNICEF did not integrate salary costs of its own local staff in the calculation, although it took them quite some time during the two years of the pre-identification process. We suspect that some other expenditure might have to be allocated to pre-identification. In Kirivong, Enfants & Développement donated collection boxes for the pagodas and printed vouchers for a total of $2,200. As a reminder, no equity certificates were distributed. Apart from this, pagodas were attributed an initial grant amounting to about $3,700. This is considered to be part of the pagoda's income, rather than a pre-identification cost.
